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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a property of balanced contributions in the context of
multi-issue allocation situations. Using this property, we characterise the run-to-the-
bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations.
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1 Introduction
Multi-issue allocation situations were introduced by Calleja et al. (2005) as
an extension to bankruptcy situations (cf O'Neill (1982)). In a multi-issue
allocation situation, the players do not have a single claim on the estate, but
multiple claims. This multidimensionality of claims is not the result of some
exogenously given di®erence in status or priority (eg, Kaminski (2000)). Rather,
the various claims result from di®erent issues, which all have the same status.
Calleja et al. (2005) generalise O'Neill's run-to-the-bank (recursive com-
pletion) rule to the class of multi-issue allocation situations and show that this
coincides with the Shapley value (cf Shapley (1953)) of the corresponding multi-
issue allocation game. In fact, they de¯ne two such rules and games, based on
the so-called proportional approach and the queue approach. As is done in
Gonz¶ alez-Alc¶ on et al. (2003), who introduce and characterise an alternative
run-to-the-bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations, we focus on the more
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1pessimistic queue approach. Similar results can be obtained for the proportional
approach.
Following O'Neill's characterisation of the run-to-the-bank rule for bank-
ruptcy situations by a property he calls consistency, Calleja et al. (2005) charac-
terise their rule for multi-issue allocation situations in a similar fashion. Because
the underlying idea of a player \leaving" the game is not easily implemented in
multi-issue allocation situations, they have to extend their domain to the class
of so-called multi-issue allocation situations with awards.
This paper provides an alternative characterisation of the run-to-the-bank
rule by Calleja et al., in terms of balanced contributions. This is based on
the principle of reciprocity, as introduced by Myerson (1980), which is often
used in the literature on the Shapley value. Myerson's property of balanced
contributions asserts that for any two players the gain or loss to each player
when the other \leaves" the game should be equal. In order to formulate this
property in the context of multi-issue allocation situations, we follow Calleja et
al. in using the framework with awards.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains some preliminary de¯nitions concerning bankruptcy situ-
ations, multi-issue allocation situations and the run-to-the-bank rule.
A TU game is a pair (N;v) where N is the ¯nite set of players and v is
the characteristic function, which assigns a real number v(S) to every coalition
S ½ N. We assume that v(;) = 0.
A bankruptcy problem (O'Neill (1982)) is a triple (N;E;c) where N is the
¯nite set of players, c 2 RN




represents the estate, which is the available amount to satisfy the players' claims.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation (Calleja et al. (2005)) is a triple
(N;E;C) where N is the ¯nite set of players, C 2 R
R£N
+ is the matrix of
claims, and E is the estate to be divided. Each element cki represents the
amount claimed by a player i 2 N in an issue k 2 R, with R being the ¯nite set





cki. Note that a bankruptcy problem
can be interpreted as a MIA situation with jRj = 1.
The idea behind balanced contributions is to compare reduced situations, in
which one of the players has been \sent away" with a particular payo®. In the
framework of MIA, however, one cannot \send away" a player with a payo®,
since it is unclear what the claims matrix in the reduced situation should be.
Simply removing this player from the claims matrix does not work, because this
ignores the interdependence between the issues. In order to accommodate the
idea of balanced contributions, we use the same extension of the domain that
Calleja et al. (2005) use for their characterisation of the run-to-the-bank rule
using consistency.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation with awards (Calleja et al. (2005))
2is a 4-tuple (N;E;C;¹) where (N;E;C) is a MIA situation and ¹ 2 RF rep-
resents an award vector related to the coalition F ½ N. The idea is that all
players are still part of the game, but any solution must give the players in F
their predetermined award ¹. Hence, we assume this award vector ¹ to satisfy X
i2F
¹i · E and
X
i2F
¹i = E if F = N.
Note that a MIA situation is a MIA situation with awards with F = ;.
So indeed, introducing awards extends the domain and any characterisation
of a rule on the class of MIA situations with awards uniquely determines the
restriction of this rule on the class of MIA situations without awards.
A MIA solution with awards ª is a function which associates with every
MIA situation with awards (N;E;C;¹) a vector ª(N;E;C;¹) 2 RN such that1





Let (N;E;C) be a MIA situation and consider an order2 on the issues ¿ 2
¦(R). We denote by ck =
X
i2N




cki the total of claims of coalition S ½ N according to issue k 2 R.
Suppose that only the ¯rst t issues in the order ¿ can be fully satis¯ed where





c¿(s) · Eg and let E0 = E ¡
t X
s=1
c¿(s) be the remaining estate.
Next, suppose that E0 is distributed among the players for the issue ¿(t + 1)
according to the order ¾ 2 ¦(N). Thus, only the ¯rst q agents in this order





c¿(t+1)¾(p) · E0g. Then the
next function describes exactly the amount that the players in S ½ N obtain
according to issue ¿(t + 1) if the order on the players is ¾ 2 ¦(N) and the
remaining estate is E0:
g(S;¿(t + 1);¾;E0) =
8
> > > > > > > <









c¿(t+1)¾(p) if ¾(q + 1) = 2 S.




cki for all i 2 N) in the de¯nition of multi-issue allocation solution with
awards.
2¦(R) = f¿ j¿ : f1;:::;jRjg ! Rg, so ¿(k) denotes the issue placed at position k according
to ¿.




c¿(s);S + g(S;¿(t + 1);¾;E0):











= E ¡ max
¿2¦(R)
fNnS(¿);




with ^ ¾ 2 ¦(N) such that ^ ¾¡1(N n S) = f1;:::;jN n Sjg.
This game assigns to each coalition S ½ N the quantity which is left after
coalition N n S gets the maximal payo® by choosing an order in the issues and
an order in the players. An optimal order for the players in N n S obviously
puts them at the front of the queue.
Let (N;E;C;¹) a MIA situation with awards and take ° 2 ¦(F). The








with ¦°(N) = f¾ 2 ¦(N)j8q2f1;:::;jFjg : ¾(q) = °(q)g.












for all p 2 f1;:::;jNjg with ¾(p) = 2 F.
The vector ½¾(p)(¾;¹) is interpreted as follows. Firstly, all the players in F
receive their awards and get a position at the front of the order ¾. Then, each
player in N nF receives the maximal payo® by choosing an order on the issues,
keeping in mind that he has to compensate all the preceding players in the order
¾ for the di®erence between the payo® they have received and what they receive
when the order on the issues is the order that the player chooses.
If F = ;, then there are no ¯xed players to put at the front of the queue and
the de¯nition boils down to the run-to-the-bank rule for MIA situations. In the
next section, we provide a characterisation of the rule on the wider domain of
MIA situations with awards, which of course uniquely determines the run-to-
the-bank rule for MIA situations without awards as well.
43 Balanced contributions
In this section we axiomatically characterise the run-to-the-bank rule with awards
by means of the property of balanced contributions.
A MIA solution with awards ª satis¯es balanced contributions if for all MIA
situations with awards (N;E;C;¹) and for all i;j 2 N n F we have that
ªi(N;E;C;¹) ¡ ªi(N;E;C;¹j) = ªj(N;E;C;¹) ¡ ªj(N;E;C;¹i);
where for all ` 2 N n F, ¹` 2 RF[f`g is such that ¹`
















with ¾ 2 ¦°(N) for arbitrary ° 2 ¦(F) such that ¾(jFj + 1) = `.
This property says that the loss or gain for player i when player j receives his
maximal payo® and becomes a member in the coalition related to the awards
vector is the same as the loss or gain for player j when player i receives his
maximal payo® and becomes a member in the coalition related to the awards
vector.
Theorem 3.1. The run-to-the-bank rule with awards is the unique MIA solution
with awards that satis¯es balanced contributions.
Proof:
Existence.
We ¯rst show that the rule satis¯es balanced contributions. To this aim, let
(N;E;C;¹) be a MIA situation with awards and let ° 2 ¦(F). We de¯ne the









¹k if S = N n F.
Myerson (1980) proves that in TU games the Shapley value3 © satis¯es a
property of balanced contributions. Applying this result to w we obtain that
for all i;j 2 N n F we have4
©i(N nF;w)¡©i(N n(F [ fjg);w) = ©j(N nF;w)¡©j(N n(F [ fig);w): (1)
We will show that
½i(¹) = ©i(N n F;w) for all i 2 N n F. (2)
For this purpose, let i 2 NnF and let ¾ 2 ¦°(N). De¯ne the order ® 2
¦(N n F) by ®(p) = ¾(jNj ¡ p + 1) for all p 2 f1;:::;jNnFjg.
We distinguish between two cases:






i (v), where m¾
i (v) = v(¾(1);:::;i) ¡ v(¾(1);:::;¾(¾¡1(i) ¡ 1)) is the marginal
contribution of player i to the players in front of him according to ¾.
4For convenience, we denote the restriction of the game w to N n (F [ fjg) also by w.


















¹k ¡ v(N;E;C)(f¾(jFj + 2);:::;¾(jNj)g)
= w(N n F) ¡ w(f¾(jFj + 2);:::;¾(jNj)g)




















= v(N;E;C)(f¾(jFj + s);:::;¾(jNj)g)
¡v(N;E;C)(f¾(jFj + s + 1);:::;¾(jNj)g)
= w(f¾(jFj + s);:::;¾(jNj)g)
¡w(f¾(jFj + s + 1);:::;¾(jNj)g)

















i (w) = ©i(N n F;w):





k = v(N;E;C)(Nn(F [ fjg)) by the de¯nition
of ¹j, one can show
½i(¹j) = ©i(N n (F [ fjg);w) for all i, j 2 N n F: (3)
Finally, as a result of (1),(2), and (3), for all i;j 2 N n F we have
½i(¹) ¡ ½i(¹j) = ©i(N n F;w) ¡ ©i(N n F [ fjg;w)
= ©j(N n F;w) ¡ ©j(N n F [ fig;w) = ½j(¹) ¡ ½j(¹i):
6Uniqueness.
We show uniqueness by induction on the size of F. Suppose that ª1 and ª2 are
two MIA solutions with awards satisfying balanced contributions.
If F = N, by the de¯nition of MIA solution with awards, ª1(N;E;C;¹) =
¹ = ª2(N;E;C;¹).
If jFj = jNj ¡ 1, on account of the de¯nition of MIA solution with awards,
we know that ª1
k(N;E;C;¹) = ¹k = ª2
k(N;E;C;¹) for all k 2 F. In view of
the fact that any MIA solution with awards satis¯es e±ciency, we conclude that
in this case ª1(N;E;C;¹) = ª2(N;E;C;¹).
Let t 2 f0;:::;jNj ¡ 2g and assume that ª1(N;E;C;¹) = ª2(N;E;C;¹)
for every MIA situation with awards (N;E;C;¹) with jFj = t + 1.












where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis. Due to the
de¯nition of a MIA solution with awards,
ª1
k(N;E;C;¹) = ¹k = ª2
k(N;E;C;¹) for all k 2 F: (5)












By (4) and (6) we obtain that
ª1
k(N;E;C;¹) = ª2
k(N;E;C;¹) for all k 2 N n F:
This last expression and (5) give us uniqueness.
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